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Abstract
Lund (2002a) showed in a CAPM-type model how tax depreciation schedules
aﬀect required expected returns after taxes. Even without leverage higher tax rates
implied lower betas when tax deductions were risk free. Here they are risky, and
marginal investment is taxed together with inframarginal in an analytical model
of decreasing returns. With imperfect loss oﬀset tax claims are analogous to call
options. The beta of equity is still decreasing in the tax rate, but increasing in the
underlying volatility. The results are important if market data are used to infer
required expected returns, and in discussions of tax design.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents an analytical model of imperfect loss oﬀset, values tax claims based on
capital market equilibrium relationships, and explores the consequences for the after-tax
systematic risk of equity. In order for a marginal investment to be taxed together with
infra-marginal investments, an analytical production function with decreasing returns to
scale is introduced. In order to be consistent with capital market equilibrium, it is assumed
that the ﬁrm pays a fee to obtain this technology.
The public economics literature on the relationship between taxation and the cost of
capital typically neglects uncertainty,1 while the ﬁnance literature typically focuses on the
tax treatment of debt or on diﬀerential taxation of diﬀerent forms of capital income on the
investors’ hands.2 The points made in the present paper are valid (also) when there is no
debt, and irrespective of diﬀerential taxation of the shareholders.
Diﬀerent corporate tax systems split the risk between the ﬁrm and the government in
diﬀerent ways. There is not one general required expected rate of return after corporate
tax. An average will not do either. Instead one must consider how each tax system aﬀects
the risk characteristics of the after-corporate-tax cash ﬂow. In particular, depreciation
schedules, interest deductibility, and loss oﬀset are important.
Lund (2002a) showed how a standard corporate income tax aﬀects the systematic risk
of after-tax cash ﬂows when investments are not expensed, but tax deductible according
to a depreciation schedule. That study ﬁrst considered the case of full (perfect) loss oﬀset
(or more generally, a tax position known with full certainty). Perfect loss oﬀset will be a
good approximation for some large ﬁrms,3 but in reality future tax deductions connected
with the marginal investment4 are not completely risk free. As an alternative Lund (2002a)
considered a case where the marginal investment was supposed to yield operating income
in the second period which would be taxed alone. The depreciation deduction would be
lost to the extent that it exceeded the second-period operating income.
More realistically, the marginal investment will be taxed together with other activities
in the ﬁrm. In the present paper there are supposed to be decreasing returns to scale, while
all uncertainty originates from a single stochastic variable, the second-period output price.
1
This is just a ﬁrst step towards more realism, but suﬃciently complicated for a separate
study. Further extensions may be a multi-period model and/or more stochastic variables,
such as prices of more than one output, not perfectly correlated.
In order to get results consistent with an equilibrium in capital markets, the ﬁrm will
have a net market value of zero. In the CAPM jargon,5 the ﬁrm is on the security market
line. The proﬁtable DRS (decreasing returns to scale) technology can only be obtained
by paying a “fee” for it, e.g., by buying a license or patent, or by doing research and
development. The magnitude of this expense is determined competitively. It is supposed
to be immediately tax deductible, although alternative tax treatments are considered in
the appendix. Apart from DRS the assumptions will be as in Lund (2002a). Only parts
of the motivation are repeated here.
It is possible to arrive at results on the eﬀect of taxation under uncertainty which are
powerful, consistent with the assumptions of the present paper, but derived in a more
straightforward way. Fane (1987) is an example, relying on value additivity, considering
separately the risk of each of the cash ﬂow’s elements.6 The method in the present paper
is more suitable not only for imperfect loss oﬀset, but generally when the systematic risk
of the net after-tax cash ﬂow of a ﬁrm is of interest. This is consistent with the practice
of most ﬁrms,7 and is essential whenever data from ﬁnancial markets are used to estimate
required expected rates of return for new projects.8
Levy and Arditti (1973) observe that taxes with depreciation schedules aﬀect the re-
quired expected rate of return after tax. Their model is an extension of Modigliani and
Miller (1963), introducing depreciable assets in their model, but maintaining their assump-
tions of perpetual projects and full loss oﬀset. Lund (2003) discusses their model and claims
that a more realistic alternative turns their results around.9 The appendix below shows
the exact relationship between the results of the present paper and those of Lund (2003).
Galai (1988) (very brieﬂy, p. 81) and Derrig (1994) both discuss the eﬀect of a corporate
income tax on the systematic risk of equity based on the CAPM. Derrig does not observe
the necessity of solving for the expected rate of return of an after-tax marginal project.10
Both Levy and Arditti (1973) and Derrig (1994) consider only one simple tax system,
and assume that the ﬁrm is certain to be in tax position. The present paper (like Lund
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(2002a)) is an extension in both respects. Galai (1988) considers both risky debt and a
risky tax position, but only one tax system. None of the previous studies consider DRS.
The paper is a supplement to the empirical work on estimating marginal tax rates of
ﬁrms, taking tax carry-forward and carry-back into consideration. Some central references
are Shevlin (1990), Graham (1996), and Shanker (2000). While the empirical studies are
more realistic by taking multi-period eﬀects into account, the present model gives analytical
solutions, identifying which factors are likely to have important eﬀects.
Section 2 presents a two-period model in which the ﬁrm produces with decreasing
returns to scale and pays taxes with certainty. Section 3 introduces uncertainty about
whether taxes are paid. While these two sections focus on the after-tax cost of capital,
section 4 gives results on the cost of capital before taxes. Section 5 contains additional
discussion of some aspects of the model. Section 6 concludes. Some proofs and additional
details are in the appendix.
2 The model when the tax position is certain
A ﬁrm invests in period 0 and produces in period 1, only. The ﬁrm considers an investment
project with decreasing returns to scale. It is free to choose the scale of investment. The
optimal choice is endogenous, determined by the tax system and other parameters in each
case below. In this way we also characterize the minimum required expected return to
equity in each case.
Assumption 1: The ﬁrm maximizes its market value according to a tax-adjusted Cap-
ital Asset Pricing Model,
E(ri) = rθ + βi[E(rm)− rθ], (1)
where r > 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1].11
This allows for diﬀerences in the tax treatment on the hands of the ﬁrm’s owners of
income from equity and income from riskless bonds, reﬂected in the tax parameter θ.12 In
a discussion of taxation and the CAPM it seems reasonable to allow for θ < 1, but it has
no consequences for the results which follow. The standard CAPM with θ = 1 is all that
is needed.
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When various tax systems are considered below, these are assumed not to aﬀect the cap-
ital market equilibrium. This will be a good approximation if they apply in small sectors
of the economy (e.g., natural resource extraction), or abroad in economies (“host coun-
tries”) which are small in relation to the domestic one.13 This is thus a partial equilibrium
analysis.
The (“home”) economy where the ﬁrm’s shares are traded may have a tax system,
which is exogenously given in the analysis, and reﬂected in θ. This is often referred to as
a “personal” tax system, even though the owners may be ﬁrms or other institutions.
A consequence of the CAPM is that the claim to any uncertain cash ﬂow X, to be
received in period 1, has a period-0 value of
ϕ(X) =
1
1 + rθ
[E(X)− λθ cov(X, rm)], (2)
where λθ = [E(rm)−rθ]/ var(rm). Equation (2) deﬁnes a valuation function ϕ to be applied
below.
A product price, P , will most likely not have an expected rate of price increase which
satisﬁes the CAPM.14 A claim on one unit of the product will satisfy the CAPM, however,
so that the beta value of P should be deﬁned in relation to the return P/ϕ(P ),
βP =
cov( P
ϕ(P )
, rm)
var(rm)
. (3)
It is possible to express this more explicitly, without the detour via ϕ(P ), namely as
βP =
1 + rθ
E(P ) var(rm)
cov(P,rm)
− [E(rm)− rθ]
, (4)
cf. equation (4) of Ehrhardt and Daves (2000).
Assumption 2: In period 0 the ﬁrm invests an amount I > 0 in a project. In period
1 the project produces a quantity Q = f(I) > 0 to be sold at an uncertain price P . The
production function f has f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0. The joint probability distribution of (P, rm) is
exogenous to the ﬁrm, and cov(P, rm) > 0. There is no production ﬂexibility; Q is ﬁxed
after the project has been initiated.
The assumption of cov(P, rm) > 0 can easily be relaxed. It is only a convenience in
order to simplify the verbal discussions below.
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In order to arrive at some of the results in what follows, the speciﬁcation
f(I) = ωIα, (5)
is used in some places, with ω > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1), so that α = f ′(I)I/f(I), a constant
elasticity.
Assumption 3: The fee which is paid for the right to undertake the investment project
is M0. This is competitively determined among ﬁrms with the same leverage (see Assump-
tion 4) and tax position (see Assumption 5), so that the net value after taxes to the ﬁrm
of paying this fee, borrowing, undertaking the project in optimal scale, and paying taxes,
is zero. The sequence of events in period 0 is as follows: (a) The authorities determine
the tax system for both periods. (b) The ﬁrm pays the fee M0 (and possibly borrows some
fraction of this, see Assumption 4). (c) The ﬁrm determines how much to invest, I (and
possibly borrows some fraction of this, see Assumption 4).
Assumption 4: A fraction (1−η) ∈ [0, 1) of the ﬁnancing need in period 0 is borrowed.
This fraction is independent of the investment decision and of the tax system. The loan B
is repaid with interest with full certainty in period 1.
The ﬁnancing need is equal to M0 + I minus the immediate tax relief for these costs, if
any.15
Debt is introduced only because of the prominence of debt in the traditional literature
on taxes and the cost of capital. In the present paper the results can be derived with zero
debt. The assumptions of independence between ﬁnancing and investment, and between
(after-tax) ﬁnancing and taxes, are those underlying the simplest standard derivation of
the WACC, and therefore the appropriate set of assumptions here.16
It should be kept in mind that Assumption 4 concerns the formal project-related bor-
rowing by the ﬁrm. When applied to the subsidiary of a multinational, this may be tax
motivated and diﬀer from the net project-related borrowing undertaken by the multina-
tional and its subsidiaries taken together. The lender to one subsidiary is often another
subsidiary of the same multinational. Also, the possibility of transfer pricing is neglected
here.
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The assumption of default-free debt is a common simpliﬁcation, and should be accept-
able for the purposes of this paper. Although the ﬁrm’s operating revenue may turn out
too low to repay the debt, it is realistic in many cases that the loan is eﬀectively guaranteed
by a parent company. Galai (1988) focuses on risky debt in a similar model.
It will be clear below that there may be tax advantages to debt. When the ﬁrm decides
on the optimal investment I, the fee M0 is already paid, and a fraction of this is borrowed.
These are given magnitudes when the investment decision is made, so this decision is
independent of the tax advantage of the M0-related borrowing.
Assumption 5: A tax at rate t ∈ [0, 1) will be paid with certainty in the production
period. The tax base is operating revenue less (grB + cI). There is also a tax relief of
t(M0 + aI) in period 0. The constants g, c, and a are in the interval [0, 1]; moreover,
t[a + c/(1 + r)] < 1.
This general formulation allows for accelerated depreciation with, e.g., a > 0 and
a + c = 1, or a standard depreciation interpreted (since there is only one period with
production) as a = 0, c = 1. There is usually full interest deduction, i.e., g = 1, but the
Brown (1948) cash ﬂow tax has g = 0, and some transfer pricing regulations might require
0 < g < 1. The requirement t[a + c/(1 + r)] < 1 precludes “gold plating incentives,”
i.e., the tax system carrying more, in present value terms, than one hundred percent of an
investment cost.17
Assumption 5 implies that a negative tax base gives a negative tax. While this is unre-
alistic for most tax systems when the project stands alone, it is not at all unrealistic when
the marginal project is added to other activity which is more proﬁtable. An alternative as-
sumption for the second period is considered in section 3. For the ﬁrst period, however, no
alternative is considered. This could rely on an assumption that ﬁrms only start projects
in periods in which they are in tax position to beneﬁt immediately from deductions allowed
in the ﬁrst period. This does not explain how most ﬁrms get started in the ﬁrst place.
Since M0 is immediately tax deductible with full certainty, it is really the after-tax
payment M = M0(1 − t) which is of interest to us. From Assumption 3 it follows that
it is this payment, plus any tax advantage connected with a related borrowing, which is
adjusted competitively so that the total net value is zero. It is also M , not M0, which
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determines the ﬁnancing need, so that borrowing is a fraction of M . If the authorities
change the tax rate, the relation between M0 and M changes, but it is still M which is
determined competitively, and thus M appears in the equations to follow, except towards
the end of the appendix, in which a more general tax system is considered.
2.1 Case F: No borrowing, θ = 1
This ﬁrst case (case F for risk Free deductions) is considered to demonstrate as simply as
possible the method used in Lund (2002a), applied both to the problem solved there and
to the case with decreasing returns to scale. This will show the distinction between two
concepts, marginal beta and average beta, which are important in what follows. Consider
the case with η = 1 (no borrowing), and θ = 1 (no tax discrimination eﬀect in the capital
market where the ﬁrm’s stock is traded).
In the case FC (C for CRS) of a marginal project alone, considered in Lund (2002a),
the cash ﬂow to equity in period 1 is
XFC = PQ(1− t) + tcI, (6)
where Q in the CRS model replaces f(I) in the DRS model. For each set of tax and other
parameters, Q is set so that the project is exactly marginal. The market value of a claim
to this is
ϕ(XFC) = ϕ(P )Q(1− t) + tcI
1 + r
. (7)
For a marginal project the expression must be equal to the ﬁnancing need after bor-
rowing and taxes, I(1− ta), so that
I(1− ta) = ϕ(XFC) = ϕ(P )Q(1− t) + tcI
1 + r
, (8)
which implies
ϕ(P )Q
I
=
1− ta− tc
1+r
1− t . (9)
The beta value of equity is a value-weighted average of the beta values of the elements
of the cash ﬂow. From (6) this is
βFC =
ϕ(P )Q(1− t)
ϕ(XFC)
βP =
1− ta− tc
1+r
1− ta βP , (10)
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cf. Lund (2002a), eq. (9) and (12). The main conclusion in that paper is that due to the
tax depreciation schedule, the beta of equity is decreasing in the tax rate under a corporate
income tax. Under a pure cash ﬂow tax there is no such eﬀect of the tax rate.
The intuition behind the tax eﬀect is as follows: A pure cash ﬂow tax (a = 1, c = 0)
does not aﬀect the beta of equity, since it is equivalent, cash-ﬂow-wise, to the government
assuming the role of a shareholder. As compared with a cash ﬂow tax, the typical corporate
income tax postpones some deductions in the form of a tax depreciation schedule, and
these will be less risky at the margin than the future operating income. Risk-wise this
postponement is similar to a loan from the ﬁrm to the authorities, and thus it has the
opposite eﬀect of leverage: It reduces the systematic risk of equity. Since the result rests
critically on the risk characteristics of the tax value of depreciation deductions, the focus
of the present paper is on making more realistic assumptions about the uncertainty of the
ﬁrm’s tax position.
One main assumption in this and what follows is that the underlying systematic risk,
βP , is unaﬀected by changes in the tax system. This corresponds to the partial-equilibrium
assumption made in relation to the capital market, cf. Assumption 1. The assumption is
more realistic the smaller the investment project is, and the smaller the coverage of this
tax system is, in relation to the market for the output.
Consider now the DRS case, FD. Instead of technically adjusting Q to ﬁnd the character-
istics of a marginal project, as above, there is now a ﬁrst-order condition which determines
I, and one can then solve for the fee which makes the overall addition to net value equal
to zero.
The cash ﬂow to equity in period 1 is
XFD = Pf(I)(1− t) + tcI, (11)
The market value of a claim to this is
ϕ(XFD) = ϕ(P )f(I)(1− t) + tcI
1 + r
. (12)
The ﬁrm chooses the optimal scale in order to maximize π1D(I) = ϕ(XFD)− I(1− ta).
The ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum is
ϕ(P )f ′(I) =
1− ta− tc
1+r
1− t . (13)
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The fee will be set so that M = π1D(I) = ϕ(XFD)− I(1− ta), which implies that the
total payment in period 0 is
M + I(1− ta) = ϕ(XFD). (14)
The beta value of equity is a value-weighted average of the beta values of the elements
of the cash ﬂow. From (11) this is
βFD =
ϕ(P )f(I)(1− t)
ϕ(XFD)
βP . (15)
It is helpful here to introduce the parameterized production function, (5). Together with
the ﬁrst order condition (13), this gives
βFD =
1− ta− tc
1+r
1− ta− tc
1+r
(1− α)βP , (16)
which again is decreasing in the tax rate as long as c > 0. As α approaches unity (i.e.,
CRS), βFD approaches βFC (and equilibrium M approaches zero).
Observe that βFC < βFD when tc(1 − α) > 0. The two diﬀerent expressions for the
beta of equity will be called marginal beta and average beta, respectively. They are both
relevant as descriptions of systematic risk within the same project. The average beta will
describe the systematic risk of the project as a whole, and in particular, the systematic
risk of the shares in a ﬁrm with only this project. The marginal beta is still the relevant
one for decision making at the margin, which may be decentralized within the ﬁrm. After
the cost M0 has been sunk, the correct beta for calculating the required expected rate of
return is the marginal beta.
The expressions for the two betas will be somewhat more complicated in the cases which
follow, in particular when the tax position is uncertain. But the diﬀerence will reappear.
So far we can observe that the origin of the diﬀerence is the tax depreciation schedule.
Only if tc > 0, will the diﬀerence depend on α. The costs M0 and I are treated diﬀerently
by the tax system. Since M0 is immediately deductible, the tax system is partly a cash
ﬂow system, partly based on a depreciation schedule. This will be realistic for many forms
of “fees.” Immediate deduction is usual for licenses and patents, but also for the ﬁrm’s
own R&D.
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Apart from this diﬀerence, there is no fundamental distinction between M0 and I from
the ﬁrm’s point of view. They are both paid in the same period, and the output next
period, Q, could have been written as a function of their sum. (In order to represent the
same underlying reality, this function would have the value zero for total costs less than
M0.) Another way to see the same point is that both betas are equal to βP if the tax rate
is zero, but also if the tax rate is positive while c is zero. In the present model with a sunk
cost and DRS thereafter, it is the diﬀerence in tax treatment of these costs which creates
the two diﬀerent betas of equity. This will also be the case below when the tax position is
uncertain.
When capital budgeting is presented in standard textbooks, this distinction between
marginal and average beta is not mentioned. There may be good reasons for this: There
are many details of projects and tax systems which have to be left out in a textbook. Lund
(2002a, 2003) emphasizes the importance of tax systems for after-tax required expected
rates of return. If ﬁrms continue to rely mainly on one such required rate for their net
after-tax cash ﬂow,18 they should be aware of tax eﬀects, and not only on the value of debt,
which has been the traditional focus. If they want to infer the requirement from capital
market data for their own shares, they should be aware that these data (if the model is
true) reﬂect average beta, not marginal beta. In addition to the need to “unlever” and
“untax” betas, there is now a need to “unaverage” betas.19
2.2 Case B: Allow for borrowing and θ < 1
We now allow η ∈ (0, 1] and θ ∈ (0, 1]. (Case B for Borrowing.) The marginal beta is
derived in equations (9) and (12) in Lund (2002a), and can be written (in a form which
will be easily comparable with results to follow) as
βBC =
(1− ta)Λ− ct
1+rθ
(1− ta)Λ ·
Λ
η
βP , (17)
where
Λ ≡ η + (1− η)1 + r(1− tg)
1 + rθ
> 0 (18)
gives the relative tax savings from leverage.20
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Consider now case BD, the DRS version of case B. Let the total borrowing, B, be the
sum of two elements, BM = (1− η)M and BI = (1− η)I(1− ta).21 The total cash ﬂow to
equity in period 1 will be
XBD = Pf(I)− t(Pf(I)− cI − grB)− (1 + r)B, (19)
with market value in period 0 equal to
ϕ(XBD) = ϕ(P )f(I)(1− t) + tcI
1 + rθ
− (1 + r(1− tg))B
1 + rθ
. (20)
After the fee is sunk cost, however, the relevant loan is BI , not B. The cash ﬂow is
XBDI = Pf(I)− t(Pf(I)− cI − grBI)− (1 + r)BI , (21)
with market value in period 0 equal to
ϕ(XBDI) = ϕ(P )f(I)(1− t) + tcI
1 + rθ
− (1 + r(1− tg))BI
1 + rθ
, (22)
which can be rewritten as
ϕ(XBDI) = ϕ(P )f(I)(1− t) + I
1 + rθ
[tc− (1 + r(1− tg))(1− η)(1− ta)]. (23)
The net value of the project exclusive of the fee is
πBD(I) = ϕ(XBDI)− I(1− ta) + BI = ϕ(P )f(I)(1− t)− I
[
(1− ta)Λ− tc
1 + rθ
]
. (24)
This is maximized with respect to I. The solution is only interesting if it yields a positive
πBD. The ﬁrst-order condition yields
ϕ(P )f ′(I) =
1
1− t
[
(1− ta)Λ− tc
1 + rθ
]
. (25)
The equilibrium after-tax value of the fee is M determined by
πBD(I) = MΛ, (26)
which is M plus the advantage (if any, or minus the disadvantage) from the M -related
borrowing. It is shown in the appendix that this equilibrium equation together with the
deﬁnitions given above, but without invoking the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal I, gives
ϕ(XBD) =
[
ϕ(P )f(I)(1− t) + tcI
1 + rθ
]
η
Λ
. (27)
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This gives the denominator in the formula for the average beta in case B. The beta is a
value-weighted average of the betas of the elements of the cash ﬂow XBD,
βBD =
ϕ(P )f(I)(1− t)
ϕ(P )f(I)(1− t) + tcI
1+rθ
· Λ
η
βP
=

1 + tc1+rθ
ϕ(P ) f(I)
f ′(I)I · f ′(I)(1− t)


−1
Λ
η
βP . (28)
At this point, invoking the ﬁrst-order condition (25) and introducing the constant-elasticity
production function (5) gives the expression
βBD =
(1− ta)Λ− tc
1+rθ
(1− ta)Λ− tc
1+rθ
(1− α) ·
Λ
η
βP . (29)
The structure of the expression (16) for case F is easily recognized. So is also the diﬀerence
between the DRS case and the CRS case: The diﬀerence between (29) and (17) resembles
the diﬀerence between (16) and (10). Again it is clear that βBD is decreasing in the tax
rate as long as c > 0, and furthermore that βBC < βBD as long as tc(1− α)/(1 + rθ) > 0.
3 Extending the model: Uncertain tax position
The results for case F above are based on the assumption that the ﬁrm is certain to be
in tax position in period 1. While the tax element tPQ is perfectly correlated with the
operating revenue, the depreciation deduction and interest deduction were assumed to be
risk free, relying on the ﬁrm being in a certain tax position.
Most corporate income taxes have imperfect loss oﬀset. If the tax base is negative
one year, there is no immediate refund. The loss may under some systems be carried
back and/or forward, but there are usually limitations to this, and the present value is not
maintained. In a two-period model a realistic multi-period loss carry-back or carry-forward
cannot be represented in detail. An extreme assumption which may be useful as a starting
point, and which is meaningful if the two-period model is taken literally and the tax code
does not allow carry-backs, is that in these cases, there is no loss oﬀset at all. The cash
ﬂow to equity in period 1 is then
PQ−B(1 + r)− tχ(PQ− gBr − cI), (30)
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where χ is an indicator variable, χ = 1 when the ﬁrm is in tax position in period 1, χ = 0
if not.22
Lund (2002a) arrived at an analytical solution for marginal beta in this case under the
assumption that the marginal investment constitutes the whole tax base for the ﬁrm.23
Option valuation techniques were used to ﬁnd a formula for the value of the uncertain cash
ﬂow in period 1, following Ball and Bowers (1983) and Green and Talmor (1985).
At this point it is clear that a marginal beta may now take diﬀerent meanings. A more
realistic marginal beta recognizes that the marginal project is part of a larger activity,
and that the probability of being in tax position depends on the outcome of that larger
activity. This will be analyzed in line with the model of the previous section: The larger
activity consists of a DRS investment project, the output of which is being sold at a single
stochastic price in the single future period. An even more realistic model would include
more stochastic variables (not perfectly correlated) and/or more periods.
Within this model even the marginal beta will depend on the elasticity α. A lower
elasticity means that the probability of being out of tax position is lower. But there is still
a diﬀerence between the marginal and average beta.
Let case R (for Risky deductions) denote the case with an uncertain tax position,
using the simpliﬁcations η = 1, θ = 1 as in case F.24 The following assumption replaces
Assumption 5 above:
Assumption 6: The tax base in period 1 is operating revenue less cI. When this is
positive, there is a tax paid at a rate t. When it is negative, the tax system gives no loss
oﬀset at all. There is also a tax relief of taI in period 0. We have c ∈ (0, 1], a ∈ [0, 1], and
t[a + c/(1 + r)] < 1.
To have c strictly positive is necessary to obtain true uncertainty about the tax position
(as long as Pr(PQ > 0) = 1), and for some of the formulae below to hold. The valuation
of the non-linear cash ﬂow is speciﬁed as follows:
Assumption 7: A claim to a period-1 cash ﬂow max(0, P − K), where K is any
positive constant, has a period-0 market value according to the model in McDonald and
Siegel (1984). The value can be written as
13
ϕ(P )N(z1)− K
1 + r
N(z2), (31)
where
z1 =
ln(ϕ(P ))− ln(K/(1 + r))
σ
+ σ/2, z2 = z1 − σ, (32)
N is the standard normal distribution function, and σ is the instantaneous standard devi-
ation of the price.25
In what follows it is assumed that the exogenous variables βP and σ can be seen as
unrelated as long as σ > 0. A change in σ could be interpreted as, e.g., additive or
multiplicative noise, stochastically independent of (P, rm).
26
It is shown in the appendix that the marginal beta is
βRM =
1− ta− tcN(z2D)
1+r
1− ta βP , (33)
where z2D is given by
z2D =
1
σ
[
ln
(
1− ta− tN(z2D)c
1 + r
)
− ln(1− tN(z2D + σ))− ln
(
c
1 + r
)
− ln(α)
]
− σ
2
.
(34)
Although this equation cannot be solved explicitly, it determines (one or more values for)
z2D implicitly
27 as function(s) of t, a, c/(1 + r), σ, and α.
Furthermore it is shown that the average beta is
βRA =
1− ta− tcN(z2D)
1+r
1− ta− tcN(z2D)
1+r
(1− α)βP . (35)
This means that the relationship between marginal and average beta is just as in the
previous two cases, which had full certainty about the tax position. There is an extra term
containing tc(1− α) subtracted in the denominator.
The two equations (33) and (35) should be compared with (10) and (16). Clearly the
eﬀect of the uncertainty in the tax position is similar to a reduced tax rate in period 1,
reﬂecting that the probability of receiving the tax deductions is less than one hundred
percent.
For comparison, the marginal beta in the stand-alone CRS case can be found by solving
for z2C from the following equation, also shown in the appendix,
z2C =
1
σ
[
ln
(
1− ta− tN(z2C)c
1 + r
)
− ln(1− tN(z2C + σ))− ln
(
c
1 + r
)]
− σ
2
, (36)
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which is the limit of (34) as α → 1. This subcase yields,
βRC =
(
1− tN(z2C) c
(1− ta)(1 + r)
)
βP . (37)
This is the case considered in Lund (2002a), except that equation (36) was not given
there. Table 1 summarizes the seven subcases considered. The rightmost column gives the
ratio of βi (the beta of the cash ﬂow to equity) to βP in each subcase i.
To ﬁnd the derivatives of the betas with respect to t, a, c/(1 + r), σ, α, one can use
implicit diﬀerentiation of z2D as given in (34) . This is done in the appendix for the
case a = 0. In order to determine the signs of the derivatives, some restrictions on the
parameters are assumed. One basic restriction, cf. footnote 17, is
Assumption 8: The deductions following a unit investment cost are less than unity
in present value terms: a + c/(1 + r) < 1.
It is then found that βRA is increasing in σ, decreasing in t, while it may be increasing
or decreasing in α, depending on parameters.
A further investigation has been done through numerical solutions of non-linear equa-
tions. The purpose of the investigation has been to trace out how the marginal and average
betas depend on t, σ, and α.
The numerical investigation has only considered cases with a set to zero, and the ratio
c/(1+r) ﬁxed at 1/1.05. The central parameter conﬁguration considered is t = 0.3, σ = 0.3.
These are not unreasonable numbers (when the tax period is one year). The ﬁve equity
betas for the cases with no borrowing, divided by βP , are shown in Figure 1 as functions of
the scale elasticity α.28 A sixth relevant curve for comparison would be βP itself, horizontal
at 1.0 in the diagram. This would be the beta of equity without taxation or with true cash
ﬂow taxation.
Figure 1 shows that the betas have the expected properties. For simplicity the verbal
discussion below will assume βP = 1. The two dotted curves show the marginal β when the
value of tax deductions is risk free, βFC , and also when a marginal project stands alone with
risky deductions (no loss oﬀset), βRC . These do not depend upon the scale elasticity, α.
They are both substantially lower than βP , but the uncertainty of the tax position increases
marginal β from 72 percent to 83 percent. This reﬂects that the depreciation schedule
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Figure 1: βi/βP as functions of scale elasticity, α; t = σ = 0.3, c/(1 + r) = 1/1.05
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reduces the systematic risk of equity, and that the uncertain tax position counteracts this
to some extent, but not completely.
The two dashed curves show two DRS cases, the average β when deductions are risk
free, βFD, and the marginal when they are risky, βRM . The former falls from unity to βFC
as α is increased. This simply reﬂects the diﬀerence in tax treatment of M0 and I, and the
fact that M0 becomes relatively smaller as α → 1−. βRM , however, rises from βFC to βRC
as α is increased. This follows from the increased probability of being out of tax position.
When α is low enough, the tax position is virtually certain, and the marginal β under DRS
is not diﬀerent from that under CRS and a certain tax position. But as α increases, so
does the uncertainty about the tax position, and as α → 1−, there is no gain anymore for
the marginal project of being taxed together with a DRS project. It approaches the case
where the marginal project is taxed alone.
The solid curve shows the average βRA in the DRS case with uncertain tax position.
For low α values, the tax position is virtually certain, so there is no discernible diﬀerence
from βFD of the case of risk free deductions. Then as α exceeds (about) 0.5, the eﬀect of
the uncertain tax position is that βRA takes on higher values than βFD, while still being
decreasing in α. For even higher α values, however, the curve becomes increasing, as it
approaches βRM , which is increasing. This possibility is also seen from the discussion of
equation (A29) in the appendix.
Clearly, even the DRS case with risky deductions can have betas substantially lower
than βP . In this case the marginal beta curve, βRM , satisﬁes the intuition that it has less
risk than the stand-alone marginal beta, βRC , as an eﬀect of being taxed together with
an infra-marginal cash ﬂow. But the average beta, βRA, does not exhibit this property
uniformly, and in fact, the diﬀerence between marginal and average beta is just as large in
this case as in the case with risk free deductions if only α is low enough.
Figures 2–5 show some sensitivities to changes in the tax rate, t, and the volatility, σ.
The three non-constant curves from Figure 1 are reproduced as (similarly) dotted curves,
and the corresponding three curves for the new value of t or σ are drawn as dashed or solid.
The values of the constant βFC and βRC are now only shown implicitly, as the endpoint
values for some of the curves.29
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Figures 2 and 3 show that all betas are increased if the tax rate is lowered, and vice
versa, which was also the main point in Lund (2002a) for the cases considered there. The
eﬀect on the lowest values (βFC , which is the limit of βRM for low α, and of βFD for high
α) seems to be proportional to (1− t), which is almost correct when c/(1 + r) is close to
unity, cf. equation (10), see also Corollary 2.2 in Lund (2002a). But the higher beta values
do not change as much in absolute terms.30
Figure 2: βi/βP as functions of scale elasticity, α; varying the tax rate
Figures 4 and 5 show only one βFD curve, as this is unaﬀected by a change in volatility.
The ﬁgures show that a lower σ works in the same direction as a higher t, except that βFD
is unaﬀected. But the eﬀects of changes in σ are only discernible for higher values of α,
and the magnitudes of the eﬀects are not very large.
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Figure 3: βi/βP as functions of scale elasticity, α; varying the tax rate
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Figure 4: βi/βP as functions of scale elasticity, α; varying the volatility
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Figure 5: βi/βP as functions of scale elasticity, α; varying the volatility
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A ﬁnal question to be analyzed is what happens if the tax treatment of the fee M0
is changed. The fee is a necessary part of the model in order for the ﬁrm’s stock to be
on the security market line, i.e., for the ﬁrm to have a net value of zero. This allows the
discussion to consider equilibrium phenomena. At this point diﬀerent assumptions could
be made, but would be ad hoc. However, the tax treatment of M0 could take diﬀerent
forms, in part because tax systems diﬀer, but in part because M0 can represent diﬀerent
forms of expenses, such as research and development, purchase of a patent, or purchase of
a license. A patent would in many cases be subject to a depreciation schedule, while the
other types may be immediately deductible.
A more general model of the tax treatment of M0 is included in the appendix. It
turns out that if the fractions deductible in periods zero and one are identical to a and
c, respectively, so that M0 and I are treated equally, then no eﬀect of decreasing returns
to scale remains. The whole investment M0 + I becomes a marginal investment, and the
three betas βRC , βRM , and βRA collapse to the same expression, βRC . This raises the
question whether the model of decreasing returns to scale is really only an artifact of the
tax system. The answer is that in order to represent this as an equilibrium phenomenon,
the fee is needed, and without taxation, the project would be indistinguishable from a
marginal project. The intended eﬀect of the model is that the marginal investment within
the project is taxed together with the infra-marginal investment. For a project with net
value equal to zero, this can probably only be achieved (at least in a two-period model) on
the basis of tax discrimination between the expenses incurred in period 0.
4 Cost of capital before taxes
In the previous two sections the eﬀects of the tax system on the beta of equity were
analyzed. Via the CAPM equation, (1), this also gives the eﬀects on the cost of equity
after corporate taxes, which is reﬂected in the stock market (but observe the distinction
between marginal and average beta).
The cost of capital before corporate taxes, on the other hand, is the traditional mea-
sure for the eﬀects of the tax system on the acceptance or rejection of real (non-ﬁnancial)
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investment projects. This determines the possible distortionary eﬀects of the tax system,
although the present paper does not discuss what would be the relevant basis for compar-
ison under various circumstances. Implicitly the comparison is with a situation without
corporate taxation. Also, as stated in the introduction, no general equilibrium eﬀects are
considered.
The cost of capital for investment decisions relates to marginal proﬁtability, so the
return should be seen in relation to the investment cost I, neglecting the fee M0. The
expected rate of return before corporate taxes, plus 1, is E(P )Q/I, which can be rewritten
as
E(P )Q
I
=
E(P )
ϕ(P )
· ϕ(P )Q
I
. (38)
Of the two fractions on the right hand side, the ﬁrst is assumed to be exogenous, and is
given by (1) and (3). The second is determined by the requirement under CRS that the
project should be marginal after tax, or, under DRS, that its scale should be optimal after
tax. For case F above, these requirements are given by (9) and (13), which means that one
plus the required expected rate of return before corporate taxes is
E(P )
ϕ(P )
· 1− ta−
tc
1+r
1− t , (39)
cf. Hall and Jorgenson (1969), p. 395. The distortion in “one plus the expected rate of
return” is the second fraction, which is independent of (total and systematic) risk, only a
function of tax parameters and the risk free interest rate. This also holds for the distortion
in case B, when borrowing is allowed, which is determined by (25). For both cases the
distortion is decreasing in a and c/(1 + r). Under Assumption 8 it is increasing in the tax
rate in case F. When borrowing is allowed in case F, however, the increasing value of the
interest deduction may make the distortion decreasing in the tax rate for suﬃciently high
leverage.
For case R with an uncertain tax position, the relevant ﬁrst-order condition is given in
equation (A9) in the appendix. One plus the required expected rate of return is
E(P )
ϕ(P )
· 1− ta−
tc
1+r
N(z2D)
1− tN(z1D) . (40)
Again the distortion is independent of systematic risk, but now it depends on total risk
through the N(·) expressions.
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In the appendix it is shown that when a = 0, the endogenous part of expression (40),
the second fraction, is increasing in α and σ. A higher α reduces the probability of being
in tax position, and thus the expected value of depreciation deductions. This increases
distortions. A higher σ has a similar eﬀect, and works additionally by increasing the
option value of the authorities’ tax claim (i.e., it enhances the eﬀect of the asymmetry),
increasing distortions. Furthermore, the distortion goes up if t goes up, and likewise if c
goes down, as the direct eﬀects known from (39) are dominating. These results on the cost
of capital before taxes should be useful. However, they only formalize what is (more or
less) known from before, whereas the results on the cost of capital after taxes are more
important as corrections of current knowledge and practice.
5 Discussion
The distinction between an average and a marginal beta is one of the novelties of this
paper. It has been shown that this distinction should be made even if the ﬁrm pays taxes
at the margin with full certainty, given that the tax system treats the ﬁxed cost M0 and
the variable cost I diﬀerently. Since uncertainty in the model originates from only one
project-related stochastic variable, and since the project without tax has no option(-like)
characteristics, there is no diﬀerence between marginal and average beta if there are no
taxes. But with taxes this distinction appears, even in the simplest case with full certainty
about the tax position, if there are decreasing returns to scale.
Whether the distinction between marginal and average beta is important in practice, is
another question. Most ﬁrms may be happy with a rough estimate of the ﬁrm’s systematic
risk, and may not worry too much about the details determining the required expected
rate of return. Since diﬀerent projects have diﬀerent risk characteristics in practice, it is
impossible to come up with an exact number to be used for a new project. Nevertheless the
mechanisms described here should be known by the practitioners, who may then evaluate
if, when, and how to take them into account. A thirty percent reduction in beta is hardly
negligible.
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A seemingly critical assumption in the paper is Assumption 7 on option-like valuation
of non-linear cash ﬂows. The underlying assumptions were not detailed, since they are
well known. It should be observed, however, that the approach is more general than it
seems. It is not necessary to rely on the geometric Brownian motion which is the basis for
the standard option valuation theory. Any price process which does not allow arbitrage
opportunities will do. But the exact solutions will of course be diﬀerent with diﬀerent price
processes.
Likewise, Assumption 1 on the CAPM can be relaxed. The crucial assumption is the
linear risk measure, which could even be related to more than one factor.
There are of course several limitations of the analysis. The uncertainty is multiplicative,
which may not be necessary for the model to work (cf. Lund (2003)), but for the simplicity
of the results, in particular in the case of risky deductions. The source of uncertainty is a
single stochastic variable in a single period, and there is no carry-forward or carry-back of
losses, all of which exaggerates the risk of the deductions. As presented, the model does
not allow for risky inﬂation, the eﬀect of which would depend on the systematic risk of
nominally risk free claims. In spite of all this, the model should be a step in the direction
of more realism, while retaining the possibility of an analytical solution.
6 Conclusion
Lund (2002a) showed that even in a fully equity ﬁnanced ﬁrm, the beta of equity is de-
creasing in the tax rate under a typical corporate income tax. The main intuition was
that a tax depreciation schedule acts risk-wise in the opposite direction of leverage: It is
similar to a loan from the ﬁrm to the authorities. In light of this it has been important to
consider a more realistic model for the uncertainty of the ﬁrm’s tax position. The eﬀect of
a corporate income tax system on the systematic risk of equity after tax depends critically
on loss oﬀset provisions and the probability that the ﬁrm will be in tax position in future
periods. This will depend on the total activities of a ﬁrm. This has been modelled as a
decreasing-returns-to-scale technology, which has been acquired at an equilibrium cost, so
that the total net value of the activity is zero. The model is a stylized quantiﬁcation of
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the claim in, e.g., Gordon and Wilson (1986) and Summers (1987) that the tax value of
deductions is close to risk free.
When there are decreasing returns to scale after a sunk cost has been paid, and the
sunk cost is immediately tax deductible (such as a license or R&D), while the subsequent
investment cost is deductible according to a tax depreciation schedule, there will be a
diﬀerence between the average and marginal beta of a project. The average beta will be
reﬂected (if the model is true) in the stock market data for the ﬁrm’s stock, while the
marginal beta is relevant for each investment decision within the project. If required rates
of return are to be derived from market data, this distinction has to be recognized.
When the ﬁrm is not certain to be in tax position at the margin in the future period,
the valuation is similar to option valuation. Numerical techniques were used to solve for
the systematic risk of equity in these cases. Even in this case the systematic risk of equity
is less than the underlying systematic risk (relevant for a no-tax situation), it is decreasing
in the tax rate, and increasing in the underlying volatility.
The methods and results demonstrated are crucial for discussions on reforms of corpo-
rate income taxation. In particular, the results on after-tax required returns are at odds
with current practices. Only if the authorities and ﬁrms (and other participants) agree on
these methods can there be meaningful discussions. In particular, if ﬁrms continue to rely
on using required expected rates of return after tax which are ﬁxed irrespective of taxes,
there may be beneﬁcial reforms which look bad in the eyes of these ﬁrms, cf. Lund (2002b).
Appendix
Derivation of equation (27)
From equation (20) and the various deﬁnitions we get
ϕ(XBD) = πBD(I) + I(1− ta)η − BM(1 + r(1− tg))
1 + rθ
. (A1)
Using the equilibrium condition (26) for M gives
ϕ(XBD)− I(1− ta)η = M −BM = ηM = η
Λ
πBD(I). (A2)
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(Thus we have been able to express BM(1 + r(1 − tg))/(1 + rθ) as a fraction of πBD(I).)
Using the deﬁnition (24) of πBD(I) gives
ϕ(XBD)− I(1− ta)η =
[
ϕ(P )f(I)(1− t) + I ct
1 + rθ
]
η
Λ
− I(t− ta)η. (A3)
This simpliﬁes to equation (27).
Derivation of equations (33)–(37)
This derivation starts with the average beta in case R. In case R the cash ﬂow to equity
in period 1 is
XRD = Pf(I)− t ·max(Pf(I)− cI, 0). (A4)
Under Assumption 7 the valuation, as of one period earlier, of a claim to this is
ϕ(XRD) = ϕ(P )f(I)− t
[
ϕ(P )f(I)N(z1D)− cI
1 + r
N(z2D)
]
, (A5)
where
z1D =
ln(ϕ(P )f(I))− ln
(
cI
1+r
)
σ
+
σ
2
, (A6)
and
z2D = z1D − σ. (A7)
The expression in square brackets in (A5) can be rewritten in terms of the standard Black
and Scholes’ formula for option pricing as C(ϕ(P )f(I), cI, 1, r, σ), so that
ϕ(XRD) = ϕ(P )f(I)− tC(ϕ(P )f(I), cI, 1, r, σ). (A8)
The C function has the derivatives ∂C/∂(ϕ(P )f(I)) = N(z1D) and ∂C/∂(cI) = −N(z2D)/(1+
r), to be used below.31
The ﬁrm chooses I to maximize πRD(I) ≡ ϕ(XRD)−I(1−ta). The ﬁrst-order condition
is
ϕ(P )f ′(I) =
(
1− ta− tc
1+r
N(z2D)
)
(1− tN(z1D)) . (A9)
Introducing the constant-elasticity production function gives
ϕ(P )f(I)(1− tN(z1D)) = I
α
(
1− ta− tc
1 + r
N(z2D)
)
. (A10)
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Again, M has an equilibrium value equal to πRD, so that the total outlay for a ﬁrm to
obtain the claim to the cash ﬂow XRD is M + I(1− ta) = πRD + I(1− ta) = ϕ(XRD). The
claim is equivalent to holding a portfolio with f(I)(1− tN(z1D)) claims on P , and the rest
risk free. The beta is a value-weighted average of the betas of these two elements, i.e.,
βRA =
ϕ(P )f(I)(1− tN(z1D))
ϕ(XRD)
βP . (A11)
Here, the subscript RA is introduced to show that this is the average beta in case R. By
introducing the expression for ϕ(XRD) from (A5) and the constant-elasticity production
function, this can be simpliﬁed as
βRA =
1− ta− tcN(z2D)
1+r
1− ta− tcN(z2D)
1+r
(1− α)βP . (A12)
It is also possible to express z1D and z2D in terms of exogenous variables, including the elas-
ticity α, avoiding the decision variables of the ﬁrm. Plug in from the ﬁrst-order condition
(A10) into (A6)–(A7) to ﬁnd
z2D =
1
σ
[
ln
(
1− ta− tcN(z2D)
1 + r
)
− ln(1− tN(z2D + σ))− ln
(
c
1 + r
)
− ln(α)
]
− σ
2
.
(A13)
Although it is impossible to solve for z2D explicitly, equation (A13) determines (one or
more values of) z2D implicitly as function(s) of t, a, c/(1 + r), σ, and α.
In order to derive the marginal beta for the same case, consider ﬁrst the marginal beta
derived in Lund (2002a) for the case with an uncertain tax position, equation (24) in that
paper. Under the simplifying assumptions η = 1, θ = 1, that paper’s equation (23) becomes
γ =
1− ta− tN(z2C) c1+r
1− tN(z1C) , (A14)
and the marginal beta can be written
βRC =
(
1− ta− tN(z2C) c
1 + r
)
βP . (A15)
The subscript RC (C for CRS) is used here since the case considered in Lund (2002a) did
not include the marginal project with some other activity, i.e., as if the case had constant
returns to scale.
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Again it is possible to express z2C in terms of the exogenous parameters. In this case
there is no ﬁrst-order condition for an interior proﬁt maximum, but the deﬁnition of a
marginal CRS project, which gives
ϕ(P )Q
I
=
1− ta− tN(z2C) c1+r
1− tN(z1C) , (A16)
cf. equations (5) and (23) in Lund (2002a). This lets us write
z2C =
1
σ
[
ln
(
1− ta− tcN(z2C)
1 + r
)
− ln(1− tN(z2C + σ))− ln
(
c
1 + r
)]
− σ
2
, (A17)
which, not surprisingly, is the limit of (A13) as α tends to unity. Again, z2C is determined
implicitly, this time as function(s) of t, a, c/(1 + r), and σ.
What then about the marginal beta for the DRS case? This can be seen as a mixture
of the two cases just considered. The marginal beta characterizes a small investment
which has a net value of zero. Under imperfect loss oﬀset the value will depend upon the
probability of being in tax position. In particular this is crucial in case R, for which it
is assumed that after period one there are no more periods, so that the loss cannot be
carried forward (nor backward). The criterion for the project being marginal looks similar
to (A16), but in this case the valuation of the option-like cash ﬂow to the marginal project
in period 1 is based on the risk-adjusted probabilities N(z1D) and N(z2D), not N(z1C) and
N(z2C), since they should now reﬂect the probabilities that the whole DRS project is in
tax position at the margin. The project which invests I to yield Q, and which is taxed
together with the optimally scaled DRS project, is marginal when
ϕ(P )Q
I
=
1− ta− tN(z2D) c1+r
1− tN(z1D) . (A18)
The marginal beta in the DRS case becomes
βRM =
1− ta− tcN(z2D)
1+r
1− ta βP , (A19)
with z2D given from (A13) above.
Partial derivatives of βRA
This section considers the partial derivatives of βRA with respect to the parameters t, c/(1+
r), σ, and α, and determines the signs of these for broad ranges of values of the parameters.
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However, in order to restrict the discussion, it will be assumed (a bit further below) that
a = 0. To simplify the notation, deﬁne cˆ ≡ c/(1 + r), and in this section write z for z2D
deﬁned in (A13).
Implicit diﬀerentiation of that equation gives
∂z
∂σ
=
1
σ

 −tcˆn(z) ∂z∂σ
1− ta− tcˆN(z) +
tn(z + σ)
(
∂z
∂σ
+ 1
)
1− tN(z + σ)

 (A20)
− 1
σ2
[ln(1− ta− tcˆN(z))− ln(1− tN(z + σ))− ln(cˆ)− ln(α)]− 1
2
, (A21)
where n(·) denotes the standard normal density function.
This can be solved for
∂z
∂σ
=
−(z + σ) + tn(z+σ)
1−tN(z+σ)
σ + t
[
cˆn(z)
1−ta−tcˆN(z) − n(z+σ)1−tN(z+σ)
] . (A22)
Although diﬃcult to prove analytically, it seems that the numerator is negative, while
the denominator is positive. This has been veriﬁed numerically for a = 0 and cˆ = 1/1.05,
considering a grid of 800 (α, σ, t) vectors, covering the reasonable ranges α ∈ [0.1, 1], t ∈
[0, 0.7], σ ∈ [0.05, 0.5]. On this basis it is concluded that ∂z/∂σ < 0 for reasonable param-
eter values. The sign of the denominator is also needed below for the sign of the remaining
partial derivatives. As veriﬁed numerically, it is assumed to be positive:
Assumption 9: There is no immediate tax relief for investment, i.e., a = 0. Moreover,
σ + t
[
cˆn(z)
1− ta− tcˆN(z) −
n(z + σ)
1− tN(z + σ)
]
> 0.
Consider now the partial derivative with respect to α. Using the same method as above,
we can show that
∂z
∂α
=
−(1/α)
σ + t
[
cˆn(z)
1−ta−tcˆN(z) − n(z+σ)1−tN(z+σ)
] , (A23)
which is negative under Assumption 9.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd
∂z
∂t
=
− a+cˆN(z)
1−t(a+cˆN(z)) +
N(z+σ)
1−tN(z+σ)
σ + t
[
cˆn(z)
1−ta−tcˆN(z) − n(z+σ)1−tN(z+σ)
] . (A24)
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It can be shown that the sign of the numerator is positive if and only if
N(z + σ)− a− cˆN(z) > 0. (A25)
This restriction is implied by Assumption 8, but is somewhat weaker, since N(z + σ) >
N(z). Under Assumption 8 (or the weaker restriction (A25)) and Assumption 9, we ﬁnd
∂z/∂t > 0.
Next, we have
∂z
∂a
=
− t
1−t(a+cˆN(z))
σ + t
[
cˆn(z)
1−ta−tcˆN(z) − n(z+σ)1−tN(z+σ)
] , (A26)
which has the same sign as ∂z/∂σ and ∂z/∂α, negative under Assumption 9. The same is
true for
∂z
∂cˆ
=
− tN(z)
1−t(a+cˆN(z)) − 1cˆ
σ + t
[
cˆn(z)
1−ta−tcˆN(z) − n(z+σ)1−tN(z+σ)
] , (A27)
which has an additional term compared with ∂z/∂a, since a higher c aﬀects the probability
of being in tax position directly, not only via the optimal investment behavior.
Consider now the partial derivatives of βRA from (A12). Let the denominator in (A12)
be D ≡ 1− tcˆN(z)(1− α). Then we ﬁnd
∂βRA
∂t
=
αcˆ
D2
[
−tn(z)∂z
∂t
−N(z)
]
βP , (A28)
which is negative under Assumption 9.
Next, we get
∂βRA
∂α
=
−tcˆ
D2
[
αn(z)
∂z
∂α
+ (1− tcˆN(z))N(z)
]
βP . (A29)
The sign of this is indeterminate: The expression in square bracket contains two terms
of which the ﬁrst is negative, while the second is positive. As a rough approximation,
(∂z/∂α) · α ≈ −(1/σ), so that (since n(z) < 0.4) the positive term may dominate if σ
is suﬃciently large, making the whole equation negative. The numerical illustration in
Figures 1–5 shows that the sign of this derivative changes from negative to positive as α
increases. However, it can be shown that this does not have to happen when σ is suﬃciently
large, in which case βRA becomes everywhere decreasing in α.
Next, we ﬁnd
∂βRA
∂σ
=
−αtcˆn(z)
D2
· ∂z
∂σ
βP , (A30)
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which is positive under Assumption 9.
Finally, there is
∂βRA
∂c
=
−tα
D2
[
cˆn(z)
∂z
∂c
+ N(z)
]
βP , (A31)
which has an indeterminate sign, even under Assumption 9. If σ is not too small, the term
containing N(z) will dominate, making the derivative negative.
Partial derivatives of before-tax cost of capital
The cost of capital before taxes in the no-borrowing cases is the exogenous E(P )/ϕ(P )
multiplied by
γ(t, a, cˆ, σ, α) ≡ 1− ta− tcˆN(z)
1− tN(z + σ) , (A32)
given as expression (40) in the main text. As in the previous section of this appendix, the
notation is simpliﬁed by writing cˆ for c/(1+r) and z for z2D deﬁned in (A13). Although not
shown in the above equation, z is itself a function of the same ﬁve variables, with partial
derivatives given in equations (A22)–(A27). Case F with risk free deductions is obtained
by letting both N(·) expressions equal to unity, and the CRS case is obtained when α → 1.
It would be interesting to determine the signs of the partial derivatives of this γ function.
The simplest expression is found for ∂γ/∂α, since α only has an eﬀect via z. At ﬁrst glance
it may seem clear that a higher α leads to a lower z, thus a lower N(z) and a lower N(z+σ),
which works just as a lower tax rate, reducing γ. But the facts that the arguments of the
two N(·) expressions are diﬀerent, and that N is concave for positive argument values,
imply that the reduction in N(z) may exceed the reduction in N(z+σ) suﬃciently to lead
to the opposite eﬀect: It may happen that the reduction in the expected present tax value
of the depreciation deduction has the higher impact, not the reduction in the conditional
expected present value of the marginal tax rate on the revenue side.
Analytically: The derivative is
∂γ
∂α
=
[1− tN(z + σ)](−tcˆn(z) ∂z
∂α
) + [1− ta− tcˆN(z)]tn(z + σ) ∂z
∂α
(1− tN(z + σ))2 . (A33)
The numerator can be written as
t
∂z
∂α
{[1− ta− tcˆN(z)]n(z + σ)− cˆ [1− tN(z + σ)]n(z)} . (A34)
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Even when a = 0 it seems impossible to determine the sign of this expression analytically.
While the ﬁrst expression in square brackets is greater than cˆ multiplied by the second, we
will have n(z + σ) < n(z) as long as z > −σ/2.
A numerical investigation for a = 0, cˆ = 1/1.05, and the reasonable intervals α ∈
[0.1, 1], t ∈ [0, 0.7], σ ∈ [0.05, 0.5], shows that ∂γ/∂α > 0 everywhere (on a grid of 800
points), while ∂z/∂α < 0 (meaning that Assumption 9 is satisﬁed). This means that the
expression in curly braces is negative, due to n(z + σ) < n(z).
The economic interpretation is that even though a higher α lowers the probability of
being in tax position, also when we take the optimal adjustment in I into consideration,
this does not correspond to a uniformly reduced tax rate. The impact on the marginal tax
rate on deductions exceeds that on the marginal tax rate on revenue, which implies that
the cost of capital is actually increased. (The reason why N(z+ σ) appears in the formula
beside N(z), is that the latter determines the expected value of being in tax position, while
the former determines the expected value of P , conditional on being in tax position.)
The diﬃculty of determining the sign of ∂z/∂α analytically carries over to the other
four ﬁrst-order partial derivatives, since the expression in curly braces reappears in all of
them. Let Γ be the expression in curly braces in (A34), and remember that a numerical
investigation has shown that it is negative for the reasonable parameter values which
were applied. The partial derivatives are fractions with a positive denominator, as in
(A33), so we concentrate on the numerators. In connection with equations (A22)–(A27)
it was concluded under Assumption 9 that ∂z/∂σ < 0, ∂z/∂t > 0 (under Assumption 8),
∂z/∂a < 0, and ∂z/∂cˆ < 0.
The numerator of ∂γ/∂σ is
t
∂z
∂σ
Γ + [1− ta− tcˆN(z)] tn(z + σ). (A35)
From the discussions above it is reasonable to assume that the ﬁrst term is positive, and
the same clearly holds for the second. The whole expression is thus positive.
The numerator of ∂γ/∂t is
t
∂z
∂t
Γ + [N(z + σ)− a− cˆN(z)] . (A36)
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The ﬁrst term is negative, cf. above. The second is positive (under Assumption 8), so the
sign of the total eﬀect is diﬃcult to determine analytically. The numerical investigation
showed that ∂γ/∂t > 0 everywhere on the grid.
The numerator of ∂γ/∂a is
t
∂z
∂a
Γ− t [1− tN(z + σ)] . (A37)
The ﬁrst term is positive, cf. above. The second term, including its minus sign, is negative,
so the sign of the total is indeterminate.
The numerator of ∂γ/∂cˆ is
t
∂z
∂cˆ
Γ− tN(z) [1− tN(z + σ)] . (A38)
The ﬁrst term is positive, cf. above. The second term, including its minus sign, is negative,
so the sign of the total cannot be determined analytically. The numerical investigation
showed that ∂γ/∂cˆ < 0 everywhere on the grid.
For the parameter ranges investigated, the indirect eﬀects of t and cˆ on γ via changes
in z counteract the direct eﬀects found from the case of risk free deductions, cf. (39). But
the indirect eﬀects are of second order importance, and cannot overturn the direct eﬀects.
More general tax treatment of the fee, M0
The deductions are bM0 in period 0, hM0 in period 1, where b and h are constants in the
interval [0, 1]. The extension of case R will be developed, while the similar extension of
case F can be found by setting the probabilities (the N(·) expressions) equal to unity.
In order to distinguish the expressions from those in the main text, this will be called
case G (for Generalized tax system). The cash ﬂow to equity in period 1 is
XGD = Pf(I)− t ·max(Pf(I)− cI − hM0, 0). (A39)
The valuation, as of one period earlier, of a claim to this is
ϕ(XGD) = ϕ(P )f(I)− t
[
ϕ(P )f(I)N(z1GD)− cI + hM0
1 + r
N(z2GD)
]
, (A40)
where
z1GD =
ln(ϕ(P )f(I))− ln
(
cI+hM0
1+r
)
σ
+
σ
2
, (A41)
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and
z2GD = z1GD − σ. (A42)
Again, the expression in square brackets in (A40) can be rewritten in terms of the standard
Black and Scholes’ formula for option pricing as C(ϕ(P )f(I), cI + hM0, 1, r, σ), i.e.,
ϕ(XGD) = ϕ(P )f(I)− tC(ϕ(P )f(I), cI + hM0, 1, r, σ). (A43)
The ﬁrm chooses I to maximize πGD(I) ≡ ϕ(XGD) − I(1 − ta). From the ﬁrst-order
condition follows
ϕ(P )f(I)(1− tN(z1GD)) =
f(I)
(
1− ta− tc
1+r
N(z2GD)
)
f ′(I)
. (A44)
Introducing the constant-elasticity production function gives
ϕ(P )f(I)(1− tN(z1GD)) = I
α
(
1− ta− tc
1 + r
N(z2GD)
)
. (A45)
Equilibrium M0 is given by
M0(1− tb) = ϕ(XGD)− I(1− ta)
=
I
α
(
1− ta− tc
1 + r
N(z2GD)
)
+
tcIN(z2GD)
1 + r
− I(1− ta) + thM0N(z2GD)
1 + r
, (A46)
which can be solved for
M0 = I
(1− α)[1− t(a + cN(z2GD)
1+r
)]
α[1− t(b + hN(z2GD)
1+r
)]
. (A47)
The ratio of the expressions in square brackets in the numerator and the denominator
contains the eﬀect of the diﬀerent tax treatment (if any) of I and M0, respectively, in
risk-adjusted expected present value terms.
We can now solve for ϕ(XGD) =
I
α

1− ta− tcN(z2GD)
1 + r
(1− α) + thN(z2GD)
1 + r
· (1− α)[1− t(a +
cN(z2GD)
1+r
)]
[1− t(b + hN(z2GD)
1+r
)]

 . (A48)
This gives the average beta for this case,
βGD =
1− ta− tcN(z2GD)
1+r
1− ta− tcN(z2GD)
1+r
(1− α) + thN(z2GD)
1+r
· (1−α)[1−t(a+
cN(z2GD)
1+r
)]
[1−t(b+hN(z2GD)
1+r
)]
βP . (A49)
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Furthermore, we can express z2GD (and thus also z1GD = z2GD+σ) in terms of the exogenous
parameters implicitly through z2GD =
1
σ

ln

 1− ta− tN(z2GD)c1+r
1− tN(z2GD + σ)(1 + r)

− ln

c + h(1− α)[1− t(a + cN(z2GD)1+r )]
α[1− t(b + hN(z2GD)
1+r
)]

− ln(α)

− σ
2
.
(A50)
Consider now the case where the two expenses in period 0, M0 and I, are treated equally
by the tax system. This amounts to a = b and c = h. It can be shown that this makes
α vanish from both (A49) and (A50), so that z2GD = z2C , and βGD = βRC , found in the
main text.
Exact relationship to Lund (2003)
The model in Lund (2003) has exponential decline in both capital, (economic and tax)
depreciation, and reinvestment. However, in order to compare with the present paper,
reinvestment is excluded by letting µ = 0 in that model, and the number of production
periods is reduced to one by setting the depreciation rate ξ = 1. That model does not
include the parameter θ, so let this paper’s θ = 1. By setting this paper’s parameters
a = 0, g = 1, and c = 1, one obtains the same tax system as in Lund (2003). All tax
deductions in Lund (2003) are risk free, so we consider case B in the main text of the
present paper, but with α → 1. The equilibrium expected rate of return on a claim on the
product price is called ρ and corresponds to E(P )/ϕ(P )− 1 in the present paper.
After these speciﬁcations of both models, it can be shown that the required expected
rate of return before taxes is the same in the two models, when borrowing a fraction (1−η)
of the ﬁnancing need is allowed.
The present paper’s required expected rate or return before taxes, plus one, can be
written as
E(P )Q
I
=
E(P )
ϕ(P )
· ϕ(P )Q
I
= ρ · ϕ(P )Q
I
. (A51)
The last fraction in these equations will depend on the ﬁnancing and the tax system when
the marginal investment is chosen optimally. When this is based on the diﬀerentiable
production function f(I), the fraction can be rewritten as ϕ(P )Q/I = ϕ(P )f ′(I), and
for the case to be considered, it is found in equation (25) in the main text. Setting
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a = 0, g = 1, c = 1, θ = 1, and introducing the deﬁnition (18) of Λ, gives
ϕ(P )f ′(I) =
1
1− t
[
η + (1− η)1 + r(1− t)
1 + r
− t
1 + r
]
. (A52)
In the notation of Lund (2003), one plus the required before-tax expected rate of return
is written as 1 + ρ∗b , and through some manipulation of the above equation this can be
rewritten as
1 + ρ∗b = (1 + ρ)
ϕ(P )Q
I
= (1 + ρ)
[
1 +
trη
(1 + r)(1− t)
]
. (A53)
This should be compared with the result from Lund (2003). With µ = 0, ξ = 1, the
weight w in that paper has the value
w =
tη
(1 + r)[1− t(1− η)] . (A54)
When this is entered into the equation for ρ∗b , one gets
ρ∗b =
(1 + r)[1− t(1− η)]− tη
(1 + r)[1− t(1− η)] ·ρ·
1− t(1− η)
1− t +
trη
(1 + r)[1− t(1− η)] ·
1− t(1− η)
1− t (A55)
If 1 is added to both sides, this simpliﬁes to (A53).
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Notes
∗ To be presented at the 59th IIPF congress in Prague, August 2003. This paper was
written while the author was visiting the Department of Economics at Copenhagen Busi-
ness School, Denmark. He is grateful for their hospitality and comments during seminar
presentations, there and at Copenhagen University.
1See, e.g., Hall and Jorgenson (1967, 1969), King and Fullerton (1984), and Sinn (1987).
2Modigliani and Miller (1963), Miller (1977).
3Gordon and Wilson (1986) write that “depreciation deductions are normally riskfree
in nominal terms” (footnote 10, p. 430). Summers (1987) considers the consequences of
ﬁrms neglecting this fact.
4A marginal investment is an investment project which has zero market value if under-
taken by the ﬁrm.
5The CAPM is presented in Assumption 1 and footnote 11 below.
6An example with a more general model is Benninga and Sarig (2003).
7“In practical capital budgeting, a single discount rate is usually applied to all future
cash ﬂows,” Brealey and Myers (2003), p. 239. The survey of Graham and Harvey (2001)
conﬁrms this.
8See the discussion in Lund (2002a) p. 484 and p. 497.
9The present paper extends Lund (2002a). Lund (2003) uses a diﬀerent set of assump-
tions, which are not in conﬂict with those of Lund (2002a) or of the present paper. One
main diﬀerence is that Lund (2003) does not specify a CAPM relationship, only a more
general model with value additivity, like in Modigliani and Miller (1963). It is also more
general in that it does not assume multiplicative uncertainty, PQ with Q deterministic,
as do Lund (2002a) and the present paper. On the other hand, Lund (2003) relies on
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very speciﬁc multi-period proﬁles for production, depreciation and borrowing, and does
not allow for uncertainty in tax positions or decreasing returns to scale.
10The divergence between the results of Derrig (1994) and of the present paper is spelt
out in Lund (2001).
11Of course, ri is the rate of return of shares in ﬁrm i, r is the riskless interest rate,
rm is the rate of return on the market portfolio, βi ≡ cov(ri, rm)/ var(rm), and E is the
expectation operator. The original model is derived in Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and
Mossin (1966).
All variables are nominal. As long as the tax system is based on nominal values, the
model is only consistent with a rate of inﬂation which is known with certainty, and ﬁxed
exchange rates. The underlying real CAPM would then be
1 + E(ri)
1 + p˙
=
1 + rθ
1 + p˙
+ βi
[
1 + E(rm)
1 + p˙
− 1 + rθ
1 + p˙
]
,
where p˙ is the rate of inﬂation.
12 A tax-adjusted CAPM appears, e.g., in Sick (1990) or Benninga and Sarig (1997,
2003).
13In Bulow and Summers (1984) it is assumed that even a change in the U.S. corporate
tax system can be meaningfully analyzed with partial equilibrium methods, since the ﬁrms
traded in the U.S. capital market have their activities world wide, and the “U.S. corporate
sector represents less than one-tenth of the world free market wealth” (their footnote 3).
14The product price has what McDonald and Siegel (1984) call an (expected-)rate-of-
return shortfall.
15η is in this sense the ratio of equity to assets after tax, as will become clear below.
16Another defence for not introducing a more sophisticated theory of debt ﬁnancing is
that the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) shows that most ﬁrms have a ﬁxed target
debt ratio.
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17In parts of the literature, such as King (1977), p. 232, the nominal sum of deductions,
here a + c, is set to unity. But there “is not need to restrict the sum” of deductions “to
unity,” according to King and Fullerton (1984), p. 19, who observe that at “certain times
it exceeds unity (for example, when accelerated depreciation does not reduce the base
for standard depreciation allowances).” In the present paper, a and c are considered as
separate, exogenous variables, so that an increase in a is analyzed as if c is kept constant,
and vice versa.
18The alternative valuation by elements is known as adjusted present value, APV, since
Myers (1974).
19To “unlever” betas is known from standard textbooks. See Lund (2002a, pp. 484,
497) on “untaxing” betas from market data when the ﬁrm operates under diﬀerent tax
systems, and on the mistakes which can be made if ﬁrms or authorities evaluate diﬀerent
tax systems using a single required expected rate of return.
20If g = 1 (interest payments are fully tax deductible) debt may be attractive for tax
reasons, but if at the same time θ = 1− tg, this exact advantage is captured in the capital
market where the ﬁrm’s stock is traded, so that the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent towards borrowing.
21For simplicity, the model does not allow for diﬀerent leverage of the two costs M and
I, although that might have been more realistic.
22Partial loss oﬀset may have to do with loss of (expected) present value due to (the
possibility of) postponed deductions. If a loss can only be deducted within the same
period, however, a concept of partial loss oﬀset would only be interesting if the project
is of non-negligible size and the ﬁrm has other activity, since without other activity, the
tax base from the project is either positive or negative — no third alternative exists. For
analyzing the case with other activity, simplify here by setting B = 0. Partial loss oﬀset
occurs in two cases: If PQ − cI < 0 and the net taxable income from the other activity
is in the interval (0, |PQ − cI|), then the project loss reduces the taxes due on the other
activity. If PQ − cI > 0 and the net taxable income from the other activity is in the
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interval (−(PQ− cI), 0), then deduction of the loss from the other activity reduces taxes
due on the project.
23The current paper improves upon the solution for the case considered in Lund (2002a),
by pointing out that the variables z1 and z2 used in equation (19) in that paper can
be rewritten in terms of the exogenous parameters, given that the production function
has a constant elasticity. Observe in particular that whereas the option value in general
depends on a rate-of-return shortfall (in an unconstrained equilibrium often identiﬁed as
a convenience yield), this dependency is not reﬂected in the formulae here, given that the
ﬁrst-order condition of the ﬁrm is satisﬁed.
24It would certainly be interesting to consider leverage and uncertain tax positions in
the same model. However, the analysis which follows, and in particular the extension to
more general tax deductions in the appendix, is suﬃciently complicated as it is. After
all, it is well known that the beta of equity depends on the tax rate in the presence of
leverage, and one main point of Lund (2002a) and the present paper is to establish that
this also holds in the absence of leverage. Two starting points for extending this research to
combine leverage and an uncertain tax position are Galai (1988) with risky debt and Lund
(2002a) with default-free debt. Assumptions 3 and 5 in Lund (2002a) may be somewhat
unrealistic when taken together. They imply that the debt is repaid with certainty, for
instance by a parent company if the ﬁrm analyzed has insuﬃcient cash ﬂow. At the same
time the tax value of the interest deduction is only obtained to the extent that the ﬁrm
is in tax position. One could imagine instead that the parent company also obtains an
interest deduction, but perhaps at a diﬀerent tax rate.
25Lund (2002a) discusses the conditions under which the formula can be modiﬁed with rθ
replacing r. If θ < 1, this must rely on an assumption that anyone who trades in securities
is more heavily taxed on their interest income than on their equity income. However, in
order to simplify the presentation of the additional complications of this section, θ is set
to unity in what follows.
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26Speciﬁcally, additive noise could be ε, stochastically independent of (P, rm), with
E(ε) = 0. Then cov(P + ε, rm) = cov(P, rm). Multiplicative noise could be ψ, stochas-
tically independent of (P, rm), with E(ψ) = 1. Then cov(Pψ, rm) = cov(P, rm). These
reasonable cases show that the correlation coeﬃcient of (P, rm) should not (always) be
assumed unaﬀected if P becomes more risky. This points out an important reservation to
the discussion in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), in particular the claim on p. 179 that “when
the σ of the P asset increases, µ must increase” (where µ is the required expected rate
of return according to the CAPM). This is not true in general (but it can be true due to
non-linear taxation). Of course, the argument made here does not mean that σ could be
zero while β is diﬀerent from zero.
27The solutions (when a = 0 and c/(1 + r) = 1/1.05) show that z2D is negative (or in
one case equal to 0.001) approximately when σ − t − 2(1 − α) ≥ 0.3, an (approximate)
linear relationship. To interpret this, recall that N(z2D) is the risk-adjusted probability
of being in tax position. This will be less than 0.5 if σ and α are large, while t is small.
Since the formula relies on the ﬁrst order condition, the eﬀect via optimal investment is
included here. Optimal investment increases when t is small, even though this increases the
probability of being out of tax position at the margin. A high α reduces the infra-marginal
proﬁt. The eﬀect of an increased σ may not be so obvious, since the probability of P being
less than its median is unaﬀected (and equal to 0.5). But the tax base also includes a
negative constant term, which explains the eﬀect.
28For each numerical version of each of the nonlinear equation systems (34) and (36)
the solution method identiﬁed one solution which might not be a unique solution. The
program then did a grid search through 400 z2 values for other solutions, but these were
never found. It seems reasonable to conclude that the solutions found are likely to be
unique. For equation (36) the uniqueness may depend on α being a constant. A more
general version with a non-constant α(I) might lead to several solutions.
29So far no indications have been found that the dependency on t or σ should be non-
monotonous. But these are solutions to non-linear equations, and the possibility has not
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been ruled out. For the parameters shown, however, there is every reason to believe that
the solutions are unique.
30This eﬀect of a diﬀerent tax rate becomes particularly pronounced under some systems
of taxation of natural resource rents, in which marginal tax rates on ﬁrms have been
between 50 and 85 percent. When these systems have investment based deductions spread
over several years, such as depreciation deductions, the beta of equity becomes quite low.
Serious mistakes could be made if ﬁrms apply the same cost of equity under such tax
systems as under others, cf. Lund (2002b).
31The partial derivatives of Black and Scholes’ formula can be found, e.g., in Haug (1998),
or in most textbooks on option theory. They look as if they neglect the dependence of z1
and z2 on the arguments, but they do not.
44
References
Ball, Ray, and John Bowers. (1983). “Distortions created by taxes which are options on
value creation: The Australian Resource Rent Tax proposal.” Australian Journal of
Management 8, 1–14.
Benninga, Simon, and Oded Sarig. (2003). “Risk, returns, and values in the presence of
diﬀerential taxation.” Journal of Banking and Finance 27, 1123–1138.
Benninga, Simon Z., and Oded H. Sarig. (1997). Corporate Finance: A Valuation Ap-
proach. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Brealey, Richard A., and Stewart C. Myers. (2003). Principles of Corporate Finance, 7th
ed. Boston: Irwin/McGraw-Hill.
Brown, E. Cary. (1948). “Business income, taxation, and investment incentives.” In L.
Metzler et al. (eds.), Income, Employment, and Public Policy: Essays in Honor of Alvin
H. Hansen. New York: Norton.
Bulow, Jeremy I., and Lawrence H. Summers. (1984). “The taxation of risky assets.”
Journal of Political Economy 92, 20–39.
Derrig, Richard A. (1994). “Theoretical considerations of the eﬀect of federal income taxes
on investment income in property-liability ratemaking.” Journal of Risk and Insurance
61, 691–709.
Dixit, Avinash K., and Robert S. Pindyck. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.
Ehrhardt, Michael C., and Phillip R. Daves. (2000). “Capital budgeting: The valuation
of unusual, irregular, or extraordinary cash ﬂows.” Financial Practice and Education
10, 106–114.
Fane, George. (1987). “Neutral taxation under uncertainty.” Journal of Public Economics
33, 95–105.
Galai, Dan. (1988). “Corporate income taxes and the valuation of the claims on the
corporation.” Reseach in Finance 7, 75–90.
45
Gordon, Roger H., and John D. Wilson. (1989). “Measuring the eﬃciency cost of taxing
risky capital income.” American Economic Review 79, 427–439.
Graham, John R. (2000). “Proxies for the corporate marginal tax rate.” Journal of
Financial Economics 42, 187–221.
Graham, John R., and Campbell R. Harvey. (2001). “The theory and practice of corporate
ﬁnance: evidence from the ﬁeld.” Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187–243.
Green, Richard C., and Eli Talmor. (1985). “The structure and incentive eﬀects of corpo-
rate tax liabilities.” Journal of Finance 40, 1095–1114.
Hall, Robert E., and Dale W. Jorgenson. (1967). “Tax policy and investment behavior.”
American Economic Review 57, 391–414.
Hall, Robert E., and Dale W. Jorgenson. (1969). “Tax policy and investment behavior:
Reply and further results.” American Economic Review 59, 388–401.
Haug, Espen G. (1998). The Complete Guide to Option Pricing Formulas. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
King, Mervyn A. (1977). Public Policy and the Corporation. London: Chapman and Hall.
King, Mervyn A., and Don Fullerton. (1984). The Taxation of Income from Capital.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Levy, Haim, and Fred D. Arditti. (1973). “Valuation, leverage, and the cost of capital in
the case of depreciable assets.” Journal of Finance 28, 687–693.
Lintner, John. (1965). “The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risky investments
in stock portfolios and capital budgets.” Review of Economics and Statistics 47, 13–27.
Lund, Diderik. (2001). “Taxation, uncertainty, and the cost of equity for a multinational
ﬁrm.” Memorandum no. 13/2001, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Nor-
way, http://folk.uio.no/dilund/capcost.
Lund, Diderik. (2002a). “Taxation, uncertainty, and the cost of equity.” International
Tax and Public Finance 9, 483–503.
Lund, Diderik (2002b). “Petroleum tax reform proposals in Norway and Denmark.” Energy
Journal 23(4), 37–56.
46
Lund, Diderik. (2003). “Valuation, leverage and the cost of capital in the case of deprecia-
ble assets: Revisited.” Working Paper 03-2003, Department of Economics, Copenhagen
Business School, Denmark. Presented at the Midwest Finance Association’s annual
meeting in St. Louis, March 2003.
McDonald, Robert, and Daniel Siegel. (1984). “Option pricing when the underlying asset
earns a below-equilibrium rate of return: A note.” Journal of Finance 34, 261–265.
Miller, Merton H. (1977). “Debt and taxes” Journal of Finance 32, 261–275.
Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller. (1963). “Corporate income taxes and the cost
of capital: A correction.” American Economic Review 53, 433–443.
Mossin, Jan. (1966). “Equilibrium in a capital asset market.” Econometrica 35, 768–783.
Myers, Stewart C. (1974). “Interactions of corporate ﬁnancing decisions and investment
decisions — implications for capital budgeting.” Journal of Finance 24, 1–25.
Shanker, Latha. (2000). “An innovative analysis of taxes and corporate hedging,” Journal
of Multinational Financial Management 10, 237–255.
Sharpe, William F. (1964). “Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under
conditions of risk.” Journal of Finance 19, 425–442.
Shevlin, Terry. (1990). “Estimating corporate marginal tax rates with asymmetric tax
treatment of gains and losses,” Journal of the American Taxation Association 11, 51–
67.
Sick, Gordon A. (1990). “Tax-adjusted discount rates.” Management Science 36, 1432–
1450.
Sinn, Hans W. (1987). Capital Income Taxation and Resource Allocation. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Summers, Lawrence H. (1987). “Investment incentives and the discounting of depreciation
allowances.” In M. Feldstein (ed.), The Eﬀects of Taxation on Capital Accumulation.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 295–304.
47
